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Abstract:  
Defence innovation systems are structured around two main groups of players that interact in 
the development of complex programmes: the state (the client and the government agency) 
and the systems integrators. Technological and institutional changes since the 1990s have 
affected the division of labour and knowledge in the industry. In this paper we show the 
origins of these changes based on information derived from 45 qualitative interviews 
conducted between 2000 and 2008, which demonstrate the new capabilities that have been 
created within the national innovation system (NIS). We explain how the role and the 
capabilities of the French Government Agency for Defence (Direction Générale de 
l’Armement - DGA) have developed from « project architect » to « project manager ». These 
new capabilities create new interactions in the French Defence innovation system and new 
roles for the DGA.  
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1. Introduction 
The defence industries in most countries are led by two main actors, firms as the systems 
integrators, and the state and the government agency, which play an important role in the 
coordination of complex products and systems (CoPS). In France, traditionally the French 
Defence Agency (Direction Générale de l’Armement - DGA) played a fairly critical role in 
the design of defence programmes. For example, it facilitated the emergence in the 1960s of a 
high technology industry with the capacity to elaborate and monitor all French military 
programmes (Serfati, 2001, 2008).  
In the ten years from 1990 to 2000, some important technological and institutional changes 
led to profound transformations in the relationship between firms and the DGA. Both 
technological and institutional factors played central roles in this evolution because the design 
and production of weapons necessitates the elaboration of rules that facilitate the development 
of sustainable relations and the transfer of knowledge.  
 
Debate on the defence industry frequently has tried to identify the triggers and sources of 
change. Two sources have been suggested: the national innovation system (NIS) and the 
sectoral system of innovation (SSI). James (2000: 96) argues that ‘a purely national 
perspective is no longer appropriate for the study of the UK defence industry. Indeed it 
probably never has been’, while others (Guillou et al., 2009) maintain that the NIS still plays 
a critical role in the defence industry. Beyond the immediate lack of agreement over 
institutional and technological factors, the debate is rather nuanced and is more consensual. 
For instance, James (ibid) also acknowledges that it is the co-evolution of national, sectoral 
and technological systems that has shaped the defence industry, which lies at the intersection 
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among these innovation systems. The contribution of these systems is emphasized by Malerba 
(2004) who considers that SSI have a knowledge base, technologies, input and (existing or 
potential) demand. The sectoral systems agents are organizations and individuals. Malerba 
shows that their interactions are shaped by institutions (rules and regulations) and that these 
systems are transformed by pressure from a variety of factors. Over time, the existing SSI has 
undergone transformations through the co-evolution of its various elements. According to 
Malerba, this implies that a sectoral system is a collective, emergent outcome of the 
interactions and co-evolution of its various elements. Co-evolution is defined ‘not in a 
restricted sense that two things are evolving together but in the broader sense that multiple 
things are jointly evolving’ (Murmann, 2003: 21).  
Dosi and Nelson (2010) highlight the way that the industry dynamics is driven by the co-
evolution of technologies and institutions, and invite us to decipher the connections within 
innovations systems and the rest of the economy. The interactions between technology and 
institutions, and their interlocking elements and processes, are a potential source of inertia and 
transformative pressure. For instance, within the American NIS, transformative pressures led 
to the emergence of a new SSI around ‘ICT business’ and, since 9/11, to the reinforcement 
and enlargement of the defence industry through the creation of new government agencies1 
(Hart, 2009).  
The path dependence and interlocking forces within such systems are not definitely 
established and policy makers can play an active part in social redistribution, the social 
welfare system and the potential impact of a process of ‘destructive creation’ (Metcalfe & 
Ramlogan, 2008). The globalization of production is one such transformative pressure in the 
defence industry. It generates changes in the division of labour and has huge impacts on the 
state, which, paradoxically, remains the main actor within this system especially in relation to 
security (Brooks, 2007). This evolution opens the way to a range of interventions related to 
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education and training systems, labour market institutions, financial systems and science and 
technology systems, to counterbalance any potential inertia that might impede these changes 
(Lorenz & Lundvall, 2006). In the defence industry, path dependence is a reality (Serfati, 
2000). Recent trends in the NIS have led to new interactions and new connections within and 
between systems, whose internal and external sources need to be observed and interpreted 
(Mustar & Larédo 2002; Guillou et al., 2009). This article is one of what is a very few 
empirical studies on this area, despite the importance of the defence industry in the French 
NIS.  
We show how the co-evolution of technological and institutional elements has led to 
interactions within the NIS and a repositioning of the DGA through the evolution of its 
capabilities. The present research is based on a series of 45 qualitative interviews conducted 
between 2000 and 2008 with a range of organizations, including suppliers to the DGA, firms 
involved in complex products and systems (CoPS) and research and development (R&D) 
centres working on defence industry and DGA programmes (see annex 2).  
Section 2 discusses the technological factors that have contributed to the emergence of a new 
defence industry architecture. Section 3 focuses on the various sources of institutional 
changes within the NIS and the DGA, and examines the effects of potential sources of inertia. 
Section 4 examines the transformations in the DGA’s capabilities; Section 5 concludes by 
highlighting some of the consequences of the profound changes that have taken place in the 
DGA, for the French defence industry as a whole.  
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2: Changes in technological systems 
The defence industry is characterized by a hierarchical division of labour between state-client, 
firms as systems integrators and sub-contractors, and programmes - most of which are defined 
as complex (Davies & Hobday, 2005). This architecture has undergone some major changes 
in recent years, which have led to opportunities for some organizations, but have forced others 
to try to protect themselves from this external turbulence in order to survive. The 
technological complexity brought by the mass implementation of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) in weapons systems is emblematic of the changes that 
have taken place within defence technological systems. This has led to a clarification of the 
roles of the state and firms in programme development. Because knowledge and capabilities 
have become more and more widely distributed, the design and development of an armaments 
programme often requires new interactions between public and private actors, which, in turn, 
often implies new capabilities and new combinations of knowledge among these actors. 
2.1. The complexity of technological systems 
In the 1990s, design complexity increased with the development of what can be described 
as the set of systems that is interconnected by information and communication systems 
(Matthews & Collier, 2000).2 The uncertainty related to the content of knowledge and the 
management of information systems has become increasingly crucial for the management of 
weapons programmes. The French SCCOA (Air Operations Command and Control System) 
programme is a good example.3 This complexity can be depicted in terms of ‘depth’ and 
‘breadth’. Depth refers to the analytical sophistication and breadth refers to the range of areas 
that require investigation (Wang & Von Tunzelmann, 2000). In other words, depth is related 
to cognitive complexity, while breadth is related to relational complexity (Boisot & Child, 
1999). 
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In the USA, systems integration4 traditionally was conducted by the Joint Staff but as a result 
of technological change this actor no longer has all the capabilities required to accomplish this 
task on its own (Gholz, 2003). Hence, several organizations are involved, each with distinct 
capabilities. According to Gholz (ibid: 298) ‘this problem suggests that a shift to a truly joint 
systems approach, incorporating all the nation’s military assets, as part of transformation may 
require establishment of a single, joint acquisition agency to which a single systems of 
systems integrator could be attached’. Similar technological and organizational issues have 
arisen in Europe5. In the UK, these responsibilities were passed to the private sector in the 
early 1990s (Walker & Gummet, 1993). In France the division of labour changed quite 
radically with the active role of the DGA within the NIS (Guillou et al., 2009).  
In the USA and in Europe, the development of systems of systems has emerged in parallel 
with firms that have assumed the positions of Lead Systems Integrators (LSI) (Bailey Grasso, 
2007). LSI are firms that are given the responsibility for defining the technological 
architecture of a programme, and whose function is to manage and evaluate a project. The 
role of LSI provides the opportunity for the firm in question to benefit from the value created, 
but weakens the traditional positions of government agencies such as the DGA. The 
informational asymmetries between LSI firms and the DGA are increasing and generating 
tensions. The integrator needs the technological and organizational capabilities to enable the 
building of absorptive capacity and the ability to pilot the system (Prencipe, 1997; Hobday et 
al., 2005). For LSI firms, systems engineering is no longer limited to the material aspects of 
systems integration. Contractual arrangements are a central part of programme management. 
In such a context, the role of the DGA is not limited to the definition of technico-operational 
requirements, but also includes the writing of contracts between the military services and 
firms (Flood & Richard, 2006). In other words, the role of the DGA has become similar to 
that of the client that attempts to influence the industry through contracts, rules and setting up 
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of consortia to encourage cooperation or competition among firms (Depeyre & Dumez, 2007).  
In the US for instance, this new capability can be shared among several government agencies 
(including military labs) (Gholz, 2009). The French context is different because of the 
existence of the DGA which attempts to develop a shared vision of the defence innovation 
system. Thus, by facilitating the emergence of similar representations and procedures within 
the architecture, government agencies, such as the DGA, can improve coordination.  
2.2. Architectural and component knowledge as key elements of organizational 
capabilities 
The complexity of a product may lie in the number of its components, the diversity of the 
materials and information inputs, the degree to which systems and sub-systems are client-
tailored, and the complexity of the systems architecture6 (Hobday, 2000). The nature of the 
interfaces between these elements is one of the determinants of the complexity of such 
systems. In the case of weapons systems, there are numerous interdependent sub-systems7 
(Ulrich, 1995). In France, the division of labour has been progressive since the 1960s with the 
design of the Mirage IV and the emergence of the status of systems integrator for the firm 
managing the programme (Versailles, 2005). For several decades, the industry was 
characterized by a relatively high degree of specialization among firms and government 
agencies (Avadykian et al., 2005).  
For many years, the French state, through the DGA, acted as the owner, and defined the 
technological architecture of big weapons programmes8 (Cohendet & Lebeau, 1987; 
Mérindol, 2005a; Belleval, 2006), and was responsible for their design and management.9 
This allowed it to choose between different scientific and technological options based on cost 
and military needs. In defining the criteria ex ante and in controlling the division of labour 
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among firms, the DGA’s role in defining the technical properties of the defence industry has 
been significant. 
In order to understand the functions involved, it is helpful to refer to the architectural 
knowledge/component knowledge typology proposed by Hobday (1998). The term 
component knowledge refers to knowledge related specifically to the technological ‘bricks’ 
produced by the sub-contractors that are integrated within the system. The systems integration 
function rests on architectural knowledge, which makes it possible to combine and integrate a 
large variety of technologies within the design of a complex system.10 Architectural 
knowledge and technological and organizational skills are not separable: the systems 
integrator needs to possess both in order to be able to integrate and manage the system 
(Prencipe, 1997; Hobday et al., 2005). Prencipe’s (2000) study of the aeronautical industry 
shows that in order to be able to make any major decision related to architectural knowledge 
it is necessary to have component knowledge. Thus, Brusoni et al.’s (2001) statement that 
‘firms know more than they make’ is particularly apposite in the case of the defence industry. 
A firm (or organization) cannot just propose an overall structure for the design of a complex 
programme; it must be able to choose between the different technological options and enable 
their evolution. The requisite capabilities - knowledge, experience and skills - of an integrator 
are:  
the capabilities which enable firms, government agencies, regulators, and a range of other 
actors to define and combine together all the necessary inputs for a system and agree on a path 
of future systems development. In the narrower sense of firm capability, system integration is 
concerned with the way in which firms and other agents bring together high-technology 
components, subsystems, software, skills knowledge engineers, managers, and technicians to 
produce a product in competition with other suppliers. … systems integration capability is not 
merely the counterpart to outsourcing, but the capability needed to manage outsourcing as 
well as ‘joint sourcing’ and ‘insourcing’ to enable the systems integrator firm to gain the 
advantages of both outsourcing and vertical integration through different phases of the 
product life cycle (Hobday et al., 2005: 1110-1111).  
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As the technological complexity of products increases, coordination costs increase. Thus, any 
change to the ‘design’ or the subcontractors may cause important alterations to the component 
knowledge. This relational and cognitive complexity has pushed DGA to revise its traditional 
way of doing things and re-think its role within the defence innovation system. Section 3 
discusses the institutional sources of changes which have had a major impact inside the NIS.   
 
3. Institutional changes inside the NIS 
Seo and Creed (2002) emphasize that the potential rupture between institutional legitimacy 
and technological efficiency leads to the perception that institutional rules are no longer 
coherent with organizational survival. The various reforms of the DGA conducted in 1997 
and 2003 were implemented precisely to minimize this potential split and modify interactions 
and interlocking forces in the NIS (Mustar & Larédo 2002; Guillou et al, 2009). However, the 
impacts of the 1997 reform, driven mainly by budget constraints, have led to deep 
transformations within and huge opportunities for firms. For the DGA, interactions with the 
science and technology system have modified the content of its technological capabilities and 
architectural knowledge. 
3.1. The 1997 reform: break from a state controlled market 
Until the mid 1990s, defence industry contracts were characterized by state controlled 
markets and near automatic application of the ‘cost plus’ rule11 (Chesnais & Serfati, 1992; 
Hartley, 1995). This policy of ‘additional cost’ was to preserve independence and avoid the 
loss of key technological capabilities. However, the costs and delays associated with the end 
of the Cold War, coupled with reduced national funding, made difficult the persistence of this 
kind of policy. As competition increased, the DGA was given the discretion to choose among 
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domestic firms.12 In most cases, the firm selected was obliged to negotiate a subcontract with 
some of the unselected prime contractors, which generated new strategic alliances.  
New rules concerning armaments acquisition 
The 1997 reform was the result, of a new stage in defence policy making. Military R&D 
spending was cut from €4,850 million in 1996, to €3,636 million in 2004 (both at 2004 
constant rates). The proportion dedicated to Research and Technology (R&T) decreased from 
€650 million in 1996 to €380 million in 2004 (both at 2004 constant rates), a reduction of 
almost 50% in less than 10 years. The 1997 reform was also a consequence of a major change 
within the NIS (Larédo & Mustar, 2001) and led to the emergence of new policy making 
priorities. The privatization and tentative Europeanization of firms enabled new relationships 
within the defence industry (Guillou et al., 2009). 
All these changes led to the introduction of new criteria for the selection of firms, notably the 
best cost/quality ratio. Consequently, firms were obliged to implement new designs for R&D 
programmes on the basis of fixed price contracts, and to support greater financial and 
technological risks. This policy evolution was inspired by the ‘Levene’ reform implemented 
some years earlier by the UK Ministry of Defence. In France, the DGA’s autonomy in 
weapons systems concepts, which had been one of the founding values of this government 
agency, came to an end. The principle of a competitive market, open to participation from 
foreign – mostly European – firms implied the implementation of new ‘market’ relations 
between the Ministry of Defence and French domestic firms (DGA, 1997). Thus, the new 
rules of the game have inexorably reduced the informal exchanges between the DGA and 
firms (Kirat et al., 2003), although persistent ‘lock in’, in the form of export agreements 
between companies, and reduced technology transfer due to administrative requirements, 
mitigated these transformative pressures (Oudot, 2007).13  
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Implications for the division of labour 
The 1997 reform introduced a reorganization of capabilities and assets among firms and 
government agencies. Firms repositioned themselves along the value chain through a two-
pronged effort towards greater horizontal integration and greater vertical disintegration, to 
enhance the benefits from their innovation activities (Dowdall, 2004; Acha & Brusoni, 2008; 
Hobday et al., 2005; Guillou et al., 2009). While the role of firms in the realization of 
advanced defence research programmes was strengthened, the role of the DGA changed to 
one of following up complex programme developments, and more downstream activities 
related to testing and trialling (Guichard, 2005). Thus, with the exception of the nuclear 
sector, firms’ interactions with scientific and technologic networks have increased (Mérindol, 
2005b). 
The positioning of the DGA as a procurement agency 
Pre-1997, the DGA was responsible for the long-term maintenance of industry knowledge. It 
had a strategic role in the NIS between the Ministry of Defence, the industry and the various 
scientific networks, based on a complex institutional arrangement among the different 
organizations dependent on or under the authority of the Ministry of Defence.14 The DGA as 
project owner had a wide range of knowledge and capabilities. From 1997, the DGA became 
a procurement agency rather than a project-owner.15 This introduced a clear separation 
between technological policy and procurement policy and changed its role to one of 
organizational supervision rather than the provider of technological expertise (Giovachini, 
2000). Technology policy considerations have taken second place to operational needs based 
on a better cost/quality ratio (Kausal et al., 1999). The 1997 reform is depicted in Graph 1.  
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Source: Authors 
3.2. The 2003-04 reform: partnerships and reaffirmation of DGA’s role  
A significant loss of architectural knowledge within the DGA (Lignières-Cassou, 2000) led to 
a re-evaluation in the early 2000s of arms acquisitions and military R&D policy. The DGA’s 
strategic role in the defence SSI had become dependent on industry research (Guillou et al., 
2009).  
Reaffirmation of the DGA’s status as project-owner 
The 2003-04 reform introduced new technological responsibilities for the DGA in the 
development of arms programmes. The maintenance of technological knowledge, required for 
future programmes, once again became a priority, which resulted in more advanced research. 
Although this essentially benefited large firms (see Graph 2), the DGA re-launched some 
exploratory projects with various public and private actors within the NIS (e.g. universities 
and some small and medium sized enterprises - SMEs) in order to generate new ideas inside 
the defence innovation system. However, these initiatives were not enough to reposition the 
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DGA in the French NIS.16 The provision of new defence funds and this technology policy has 
generated renewed opportunities for the DGA to resume prior relationships with government 
agencies and firms.17 The role of monitoring the content of technological programmes and 
especially advanced research has given the DGA new responsibilities in the NIS to 
understand technological options and to provide feed-back on military needs. The DGA also 
tried to reaffirm its role in the management of dual-use research projects,18 by putting an 
increased weight on projects financed by the National Research Agency, enabling RRIT 
(Technological Research and Innovation Networks) (Mérindol &Versailles, 2009), and 
becoming more involved in poles of competitiveness (Serfati, 2008) (see Graph 2). However, 
this advanced R&D is mostly conducted by large firms which have benefited most from this 
transformation of the NIS (see Graph 2).  
Graph 2: Public expenditure on defence related R&T by beneficiary:  
€ million (2004 constant rate) 
 
Source: Authors interpretation of DGA and Defence Economic Observatory data 
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Difficulties encountered 
The 2003 reform provoked new problems (see Bernard & Carré, 2005). For instance, In order 
to monitor advanced research projects DGA requires the right capabilities.19 DGA has 
developed new partnerships with the research centres operating under its authority. These 
include ONERA, which specializes in research in aeronautics, and the CEA (with DAM 
specialized in military nuclear systems).20 The partnerships developed between the DGA, the 
CEA and ONERA, correspond to a model of ‘externalized absorptive capacity’ as defined by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990), where the government agency defines the general objectives, the 
budget, and the allocation of resources, but outsources the architectural knowledge and the 
management technological networks (to ONERA, CEA/DAM). If these new feedbacks induce 
government agencies to take into account the evolution of military needs,21 the 
acknowledgment of specific military claims is still faced with coordination problems. 
 
Development of partnerships between the DGA, the military services and the industry 
The 2003 reform enabled the development of new networks and the establishment of 
relationships between various private and public organizations (see Graph 3). Feedback from 
government agencies such as CNES, CNRS and INRIA (DGA, 2004, 2006), is illustrative of 
the interactions around military R&D projects and the new partnerships between firms and the 
DGA. Of course existing partnerships with LSI may be questionable,22 but the new 
institutional and technological pressures resulted in a more ‘open innovation model’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003).  
The creation of 12 technico-operational laboratories23 (LTOs) in the Ministry of Defence have 
facilitated the partnerships between the DGA, the military services and firms, and are 
representative of the interlocking elements in the open innovation model. LTOs are 
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organizational units that implement new technological platforms, involving hybrid forms of 
R&D governance, based on market mechanisms and informal relationships. These platforms 
enable experimentation and simulation of technologies within the framework of operational 
exercises and encourage feedback between end-users and the suppliers of the technology. 
They play the role of “cooperative technical organizations” described by Rosenkopf and 
Tushman (1998), and trigger new interactions in the NIS. LTOs are populated by DGA 
engineers and senior officers from the military. These specialists are selected according to 
their specific experience in procurement, in military programme management, or in 
operational duties. They work in the LTO under special employee lending agreements lasting 
three years, before returning to their former positions. LTO activities are commissioned and 
coordinated by the Joint Staff  which decides about budgets and technological priorities. Their 
work must respond to specific military needs such as electronic inter-operability between 
weapons. Collocating technical and operational experts in the same teams is aimed at 
fostering interactions and facilitating the exchange of tacit knowledge and critical information 
to solve specific problems that arise in military operations and that occur after equipment has 
been tested.  
 
These new collaborations among government agencies are depicted in Graph 3.  
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Source: Authors 
 
The intensity of the exchanges between public and private actors, however, is low. Informal 
relationships between firms and the DGA began to decrease after the 1997 reform while the 
links between the DGA and the military services increased. The creation of LTOs and the 
closer relations between operational staff and firms have become sources of uncertainty and 
have produced organizational inertia in the DGA. The ambiguities related to its future are 
causing tensions in terms of potential technological and institutional changes, and are making 
it difficult to make sense of them (for a similar discussion on Europe and the UK, see 
Fligstein, 2006). The changes are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1: 
The impact of technological and institutional changes for the DGA 
 
Period/ 
dimension  Pre-1997 1997-2003 Post-2003 
Technological 
dimension 
• Relative complexity and 
industrial stability 
• Autonomy of system 
components  
• Increasing complexity and increasing use of ICT 
• Interdependence of technological systems 
• Critical interplay between architectural 
knowledge and component knowledge 
Institutional 
dimension 
  
• Cost plus contracts 
 
 
• Fixed price 
contracts 
• Increasing place 
for competition 
• Shared technological 
and financial risks 
between firms and the 
DGA 
• New kinds of 
partnerships between 
government agencies 
and between firms and 
the DGA 
Impacts on the 
specialization of 
the assets 
• Stable co-specialization  
•  Stable division of labour 
between firms and 
government agencies  
• Various forms of co-specialization of assets 
• Emergence of new capabilities and new 
partnerships for building assets 
Source: Authors 
 
4. Inertia, changes and emergence of new capabilities within the DGA 
The traditional role of the DGA as project-owner and co-designer of technological 
programmes has evolved significantly. In no longer being the privileged player within the 
defence SSI, the DGA’s range of capabilities has been questioned, which has challenged the 
founding values of the NIS, notably the recruitment of engineers.  
4.1. From project architect to project manager: evolution of DGA’s capabilities 
Until the early 1990s, the DGA occupied a central position in the design of weapons 
programmes and acted as the interface between firms and the military service. In its capacity 
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as project-owner, it played an active part in the design of these programmes. In the 1970s, the 
DGA was able to monitor exploratory projects using in-house expertise, although it 
outsourced development and production to firms (Mérindol, 2005a). When DRET 
(Directorate for Research and Technical Studies) was part of the DGA,24 the DGA’s role as 
the national technical and scientific authority was unquestioned. 
Although the DGA was the project architect; its monitoring role was not limited to 
architectural knowledge; it also had close relationships with suppliers and subcontractors 
which enabled a good understanding of component knowledge. In order to maintain this role, 
the DGA was forced to increase the range of its technological knowledge. The function of 
project architect also had a major impact on the division of knowledge, for instance, the 
ability to co-specify and influence technical solutions.  
In the 1997 reorganization, the DGA’s DRET was dismantled and DGA became more of a 
procurement agency. The institutional changes during the 1990s underline this. Firms were 
given greater autonomy and new opportunities for the development of new technological and 
organizational capabilities (Guillou et al., 2009). Despite its critical role as technical expert, 
the range of DGA’s capabilities and especially its architectural knowledge, progressively 
decreased (Mérindol, 2005a). The loss of 30% of its workforce25 and the reduction in its 
operating costs accelerated this downward trend. The role of firms increased, especially in 
terms of their involvement in design and R&D (see Graph 2).26  Eventually, the DGA was 
unable to monitor the evolution of architectural knowledge because its effective participation 
had decreased and it had no opportunity to develop new capabilities.  
 
The 2003 reform allowed the DGA to reposition itself within the NIS and it was given the 
task of translating military needs into technical specifications. This is a highly complex task 
because of the increasing variety of the missions assigned to the military services and the 
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impacts on weapons systems performance and programme costs. DGA’s current 
responsibilities require appropriate knowledge to identify firms’ capabilities, and a good 
understanding of the financial and organizational implications of technological choices. Its 
ability to identify the capabilities associated with individual firms is essential in order to 
define the sub-systems composing CoPS, even though programme architecture can no longer 
be an in house responsibility.  
The DGA has shifted progressively from design related activities to management of CoPs. Its 
activities involve the definition of specifications, rules and modes of control, and monitoring. 
These evolutions are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2:  
Changes in DGA’s capabilities 
Period 
 
Main 
capabilities 
Pre-1997 1997-2003 Post-2003 
Organizational 
capabilities 
Priority to co-design 
activities 
b 
Project architect 
Priority to procurement 
activities 
b 
Procurement agency 
Priority to monitoring and 
technological control 
b 
Project manager 
Technological 
capabilities 
Upstream approach 
b 
R&T management 
Downstream approach 
b 
Product Management  
Management of outsourced 
research  
Partnership approach 
b 
Management of various 
networks for maintaining an 
externalized absorptive 
capacity  
Source: Authors 
 
Thus, the changes in the DGA reflect the new kinds of interactions within the NIS and are 
generating new capabilities. The 1997 reform marked the beginning of a shift in the model 
from ‘project architect’ to ‘project manager’.  
20 
 
 
4.2. New values and new skills for the armaments engineering workforce  
Changes generate uncertainty and the need for adjustment. The literature on organizational 
inertia shows that effective implementation of change may be difficult. Hannan and Freeman 
(1977, 1984), observing large populations of organizations, show that size and age may be 
important reasons for preserving the status quo in an organization. The notion of ‘imprinting’ 
developed by Stinchombe (1965), illustrates that initial values may create strong path 
dependencies for the implementation of future organizational developments (Aldrich, 1999). 
That is, the values and goals of the organization’s founder may result in a coherent 
organizational culture and a keenness to maintain these values (Cyert & March, 1963), which 
may be linked to existing resources and existing coalitions and may constitute a form of 
organizational truce and a reason for continuing existing routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Howard-Greenville, 2005). As Nelson and Winter explain, individual skills, organizational 
routines and capabilities are sources of the stability that is necessary for the achievement of a 
degree of routinization in organizations (see also Dosi et al., 2008, for a longer discussion). In 
short, individual level skills are the basis for robust organizational level routines and 
capabilities. Transformations are defined as major or substantial changes in organizations. But 
‘to qualify as transformations, changes must involve a qualitative break with routines and a 
shift to new kinds of competencies that challenge organizational knowledge’ (Aldrich, 1999: 
163). Thus, changes may have various outcomes, which may involve new definitions of goals, 
boundaries and activity systems (Aldrich, ibid). 
For the DGA, these changes implied new forms of interactions within the NIS. Increased 
expertise required the accumulation of competencies, which need to be preserved over time. 
In this context, test centres play a key role in maintaining the minimal capabilities allowing 
for the management of weapons programmes’ specifications and conception. As in-house 
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R&D has never been a priority for DGA (see Graph 4), these centres are the locus for 
dialogue between industry and the DGA.  
 
Graph 4: Percentage of in house R&D performed internally by the DGA 
(in millions of euros – 2004 constant rates) 
 
Sources: Based on DGA and Defence Economic Observatory, and authors’ calculations 
 
On the other hand, DGA’s expertise and evolution cannot be understood without reference to 
the recruitment of highly qualified graduates from the Ecole Polytechnique (one of the most 
prestigious French engineering schools). The ‘esprit de corps’, as Kessler (2005) describes it, 
is very strong, and within the French education and research systems creates a sort of 
Balkanization in which some schools/disciplines try to defend their prerogatives (Verdier, 
2006). Armaments engineers have a shared set of values based on their history, on myth, on 
the technical culture and a common language, and the representation of their role in the NIS. 
Up to the early 1990s, these engineers were at the heart of the innovation networks and 
weapons design systems. The informal relations among armaments engineers and firms were 
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dense and were based on tacit rules.27 This created path dependency since the defence 
innovation systems is very compartmentalized and ‘each governmental agency is keen not to 
lose its core competencies to another agency, manager recruitment in each agency comes 
mainly from the different and rival polytechnic high schools’ grand corps (…); and finally the 
core of the FSI (French System of Innovation) is located in the aerospace, nuclear and arms 
industries’ (Serfati, 2000: 79).   
 
During the period of the Cold War, the acquisition of scientific and technical expertise by 
DGA’s engineers depended on multiple exchanges between the DGA and firms. Following 
the 1997 reform and the shift in the DGA’s role to procurement,28 the DGA’s armaments 
expertise was called into question. Although the 2003 reform can be seen as an attempt to 
reinforce some of DGA’s technological capabilities, it can also be seen as a step back by arms 
engineers, based on the increasing and direct involvement of the military services in the 
management of the programmes that it promoted.  
In the course of this evolution, the work of DGA’s engineers, in particular, shifted from 
design to planning and management of advanced research projects. By outsourcing rather than 
conducting CoPS, skills were lost. Some organizational capabilities were transferred to firms 
(Guillou et al., 2009), decreasing the DGA’s critical role in systems integration. The DGA 
was no longer able to preserve in-depth capabilities. It needs to maintain the knowledge 
required to identify firms and/or research centres29 where design and production can be 
performed most effectively (Prencipe, 2000).  
4.3. Changes to the content of DGA’s capabilities 
In this new context, DGA must be able to identify knowledge critical for the development of 
programmes, and to create networks within the NIS. It is clear that the transition from ‘project 
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architect’ to ‘project manager’ is not automatic and involves choices, and the definition of 
new priorities, in order to maintain certain organizational and technological capabilities. The 
capabilities of a project architect vary depending on the degree of standardization of the sub-
systems. However, a certain level of knowledge about the functional characteristics of sub-
systems is indispensable. These capabilities depend also on the ability to translate operational 
needs into technological products. Project management encompasses the development and 
follow up of technical specifications. Although actual architectural knowledge may not be 
required, a good understanding of firms, and the ability to convert military needs into 
technological solutions, remain necessary. Consequently, since the DGA has become a project 
manager, its capabilities have had to evolve. For instance, the DGA no longer has to specify 
the interfaces between components, or even to prescribe the functional characteristics of 
components. Thus, its system architecture capabilities have tended to decline, and one of the 
consequences of this change is that the DGA is not the sole and privileged player in the 
defence innovation system.  
Conversely, the capabilities for integration and control, which are organizational 
capabilities, have become more critical. For the DGA, the main problems involved in system 
integration lie in the heterogeneity of the resources and competencies that need to be 
mobilized. This heterogeneity is described as a ‘cognitive’ quality because it exists at both the 
production and knowledge levels. It requires an appropriate division of labour to ensure that 
the various specialists interact appropriately, and to evaluate their technological, financial and 
organizational results. Coordination is required to develop a shared vision of a system and to 
facilitate its integration. Thus, by facilitating the emergence of similar representations and 
procedures within the architecture, government agencies, such as the DGA, may reduce the 
cost of exchanging ideas. As illustrated by the design of technological platforms, such as 
LTO, sharing relates to both representations and tools. This does not eliminate all the 
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problems involved in integration, but can reduce their costs significantly. This is precisely the 
new form of governance that constitutes the important role of the DGA within the NIS and 
which may help to overcome persistent ambiguities in the definition of military goals and 
cooperation with various government agencies.  
The capabilities required to select firms and to translate military needs into 
technological solutions are opening new opportunities for armaments engineers to promote 
their skills. Firms no longer are selected on the basis of technological performance, but on the 
quality of resource allocation in the implementation of a programme. As project manager, the 
DGA is more concerned with the number of components in a system and their interlinking, 
that is, with the degree of heterogeneity in components. As project architect it was more 
concerned with the level of sophistication of the knowledge embodied in components. The 
DGA requires a wide spectrum of knowledge and needs to be knowledgeable about the 
different firms in the innovation network in order to ensure a satisfactory level of coordination 
at the various stages of programme development. When the required components or 
subsystems are completely new, their selection will generate the creation of new networks. In 
other words, the need for coordination does not stop at the stages of system definition and 
technical design. The ability to translate military needs into technical specifications is 
essential because of the variety of operational languages involved. The DGA may help to 
reduce the costs of coordination between end-users and the suppliers of technologies. But the 
organizational capabilities required are challenging for qualified engineers because they differ 
from the founding values obtained via the French education system, which are based on 
technical expertise.  
Prior to 1997, both project architect and systems integrator required good architectural 
knowledge because they worked collaboratively within a co-specification process. The project 
architect needed in-depth and wide ranging knowledge on the co-design of programmes, 
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which allowed it to translate military requirements into technological specifications. This 
capability enabled the selection of firms and controlled their integration. The position of 
project manager requires the same capabilities. Therefore, if the architectural knowledge has 
been transferred to firms, the project manager requires some capability for integration in order 
to select firms and translate military needs, and maintain access to a wide range of 
knowledge. Though the breadth of this knowledge remains critical, the trade off between 
breadth and depth is a challenge for the DGA, firms and other government agencies. In this 
context, organizational capabilities are critical for resolving conflicts in the interactions and 
ambiguities among various actors. Table 3 summarizes these issues for the DGA.  
 
 
Table 3: Content of capabilities for the DGA  
Period 
 
 
Content of capabilities 
Before 1997 
 
Project architect 
After 2003 
 
Project manager 
Core capabilities  
 
Architectural capabilities: 
 
-Integration capabilities 
-Capabilities to select firms 
 -Capabilities to translate military needs into 
technological specifications 
 
 
Management capabilities: 
 
-Capabilities to select firms 
-Contract capabilities 
 -Capabilities to translate military needs 
into technological specifications 
 
 
Main capabilities 
 
Technological and organizational  Organizational  
Evolution of capabilities Breadth and depth  Priority on breadth  
  
Source: Our research 
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5. Conclusion  
By generating new modes of interactions and new interlocking forces, the technological and 
institutional changes within the NIS have had a major impact on the defence innovation 
system. In this more open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003), the role and capabilities of 
each actor have been modified. Based on the reinforcement of the role of large firms in 
systems integration, these firms have acquired a central position which has been strengthened 
through state funded, advanced research projects. With the implementation of new research 
and innovation policies, these firms have benefited from the transfer of new knowledge, and 
have gained greater autonomy. The DGA, in order to maintain its position as a significant 
player within the NIS and, more importantly, to maintain a minimum level of expertise, has 
implemented a large number of co-specialized assets (e.g. LTOs). As firms have become 
more able absorb new capabilities to produce innovations responding to the technological and 
organizational characteristics of CoPs, DGA’s influence within the NIS has been reduced in 
favour of various other government agencies. In order to maintain minimal absorptive 
capacity and capabilities, the DGA has had to increase its interactions with private and public 
organizations.  
 
The shift from project architect to project manager implies not only new capabilities, but also 
new goals, values and resources. New institutional rules may be difficult to implement when 
the founding values of the French educational systems are being questioned. This explains 
why, since 2003, the DGA has tried to avoid remaining a mere procurement agency and is 
making active efforts to maintain a high level of technical expertise and organizational 
capability through the development of new forms of networks. New forms of partnerships are 
necessary to ensure the monitoring, sustainability and maintenance of complex projects, and 
are vital for this government agency’s continued critical role in the NIS. Thus, the evolution 
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of capabilities is taking place within the French NIS, but prior competencies tend to create 
‘core-rigidities’, creating additional sources of inertia inside the French defence innovation 
system and, consequently, mitigating earlier changes. 
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Annex 1: List of acronyms  
 
CEA  Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique) 
CGARm   General Council of Armament (Conseil Général de l’Armement) 
CNES National Space Study Center (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) 
CNRS     National Scientific Research Centre (Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques) 
CoPS:  Complex products and systems  
DAM:  Military Applications Directorate of the CEA (Direction des Applications 
Militaires du CEA) 
DGA   Government Agency for Defence (Direction Générale de l’Armement) 
DRET  Directorate for Research and Technical Studies (Direction de la Recherche et des 
Etudes Techniques) 
EADS European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
EDA  European Defence Agency 
ICT :  Information and Communication Technologies 
INRIA National Institute for Computer Science and Control (Institut National de 
Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique) 
LSI  Lead System Integrator 
LTO   Technical and Operational Laboratories (Laboratoires Technico-Opérationnels) 
MoD  Ministry of Defence (UK)  
NIS  National Innovation System (Système National d’Innovation) 
OED             Economic Defence Observatory belonging to the French Defence Ministry 
(Observatoire  Economique de la Défense) 
ONERA French Aeronautics and Space Research Centre (Office National d’Etudes et de 
Recherches Aérospatiales) 
RRIT Technological Research and Innovation Networks (Réseaux de Recherche et 
d’Innovation technologiques ) 
R&D  Research and Development 
R&T  Research and Technology 
SCCOA Air Operations Command and Control System (Système de Communication et de 
Commandement des Opérations Aériennes) 
SSI Sectoral System of Innovation  
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Annex 2: Methodology 
This research is based on 45 qualitative interviews conducted between 2000 and 2008 with a range of 
respondents, including suppliers to the DGA, firms involved in CoPS and R&D centres working for 
the defence industry and commissioned for DGA programmes. Interviews were conducted in the 
framework of various projects such as:  
-Projects commissioned by the Observatory for Defence economics (OED): Innovation, diffusion 
of knowledge and growth: the case of firms related to defence industry, Guillou et al. (2005) ; and the 
Typology of firms defence related competencies : analysis of codified and un-codified competencies, 
Guillou et al  (2007). 
 
-Project commissioned by the EDA:  How to measure the strengths & weaknesses of the DTIB in 
Europe, with Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (2008) 
 
- Project commissioned by the OED (2001-2003): Defence R&D policy : Prospective about the 
interaction between Stages and the Defence industry (Mérindol et al).  
 
- Project commissioned by the French Air Force staff to the Research Centre of the French Air Force 
(2004-2006): Defence-related integration activities and key organizational and technological 
competences.  
 
These face to face interviews were semi-structured and lasted an average of two hours. The questions 
asked about interviewees’ backgrounds and their perspectives on the defence industry, and their 
understanding of the DGA and its evolution over time. Each interview report was validated by the 
interviewee.  
 
Data for the projects were enriched by the contribution of one of the authors to several expert groups 
on the evaluation of armament programmes between 2001 and 2006 developed for the Defence 
Economics Council and the Armament General Advisory Board. This enabled a better understanding 
of the strategic issues involved in the repartition of institutional prerogatives within the French 
Ministry of Defence, especially between the DGA, the armed services and the industry. The results of 
these projects and investigations were presented at workshops organized by the French Ministry of 
Defence (OED; Defence Economics Council; Armament General Advisory Board; DGA Scientific 
and Technological Foresight Board).  
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1   Such as the DARPA -Defense Advance Research Projects Agency- and the DHS -Department of 
Homeland Security-. 
2
  The study of the interdependencies between the different arms systems shows that the operational 
requirements of different platforms are defined in relation to one another, making the constraints of 
interoperability between the different subsystems all the more important.  
3
  This programme, launched in 1997, integrates new data link software and systems; it is a systems of 
system designed to link all the French Air Force’s weapons systems. The DGA delegated the task of designing 
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the technological architecture for this programme to an industrial consortium comprising Aerospatiale Matra 
(later EADS) and Thomson CSF (later Thales), which jointly act as LSI. 
4
  We refer to the “system of systems integration” or the “architecture systems integration” because this 
third level of integration “is now most ardently pursued by defence-oriented organizations” (Gholz, 2003: 281). 
The two other levels are the weapon systems integration and the platform integration. 
5
   In Europe, the EDA has tried to increase collaborations and scientific co operations. These later are still 
very much constrained by national regulations and lack of political willingness. For instance, in order to transfer 
technology between firms located in different countries, firms belonging to the same company have to conclude 
an export contract. National rules remain important impeding such Europeanization to occur in the defence 
related production. About privatization and Europeanization of the defence industry see Serfati (2001). About 
political conception and political visions among European countries see Walker and Gummett (1993) and 
Fligstein (2006).   
6
  The architecture of a system specifies the different sub-systems or modules comprising a system, as well 
as the relations between these entities. And as Simon (1991) shows, the creation of such an architecture requires 
a process of decomposition of the functions into sub functions. 
7
  According to Ulrich (1995), when a complex system can be subdivided into autonomous subsystems 
(modules), the latter can be connected by coupled interfaces (integral architecture) or decoupled interfaces 
(modular architecture). 
8
  Usually this means that the state determines the final specification, needs, objectives and constraints of 
the project. 
9
  The DGA currently employs 19,500 people (6,500 management and executive staff; 9,600 scientists and 
test, trial experts, and 3,400 maintenance staff.) 
10
  According to Henderson and Clark (1990) : (i)  component knowledge is knowledge about each of the 
core design concepts and the ways in which they are implemented in a particular component; (ii) architectural 
knowledge is  knowledge about the ways in which the components are integrated and linked together into a 
coherent whole. 
11
  Cost-plus contracts applied to R&D phases of programmes and  included 1) development costs, 2) 
contractual mechanisms allowing both the calculation of the mark-up (profit margin) made by the firm on the 
R&D phases and their integration in the global amount of the contracts. 
12
  According to Kirat et al. (2003), in 1994, the negotiated procedure was used for 94% of total orders, and 
80% of these contracts were awarded without published calls for tender. 
13
       For instance, Thales should have an export agreement for technologies exchange even between subsidiary 
companies (Thales UK and Thales France).   
14
  Expertise from various institutions, such as the Directorate of Military Applications of the CEA, ONERA 
and CNES, was mobilized by the military services. 
15
  At that time, the term ‘project-owner’ has been overtaken by ‘procurement agency’. 
16       For instance from 1994 to 2000, large firms (more than 500 employees) remain whereas SMEs (up to 100 
employees) stay constantly unrepresented in the Defence R&D execution (figures in comparisons with the global 
execution of R&D for the French firms). For details, see Guillou et al (2005) final report.  
17
    DGA’s spending on exploratory projects as part of its scientific research and innovation mission, is currently 
€12 million per annum. Although the sums available are limited, they are laying the foundations for a new 
orientation of military R&D policy. 
18
  Dual-use projects are mainly directed towards CNES  for space research, and towards calls for 
propositions  implementing  innovative cooperation between universities and small firms 
19
  From 2003, reinforcement of technical capabilities once again became a DGA priority. 
20
  DAM: Military Applications Directorate of the CEA. A new agreement was signed between the DGA 
and the DAM. Expanding the missions and tasks of CEA/DAM to include scientific fields that are not 
exclusively related to nuclear science, allows DGA to mobilize their expertise. DAM acts as an interface and 
provides the strategic orientations for the activities conducted by universities and public R&D centres in 
scientific and technological fields directly related to defence. ONERA contributed to the development of 
miniature drone demonstrators through a consultancy arrangement (Fromion, 2005: 46). 
21
  This aspect emerged in interviews with managers at ONERA, CEA, in industry and the military services. 
22
  These relations have taken the form of institutionalized meetings between the ‘elites’ in the political and 
economic spheres. These exchanges are rather formal. A more « open and free » relationship between DGA and 
industry is developing around upstream projects, but this relative openness is limited to a few projects where 
trust among the main actors has been developed.  
23
  For instance LTO such as SARR (Systèmes d’Armes pour le Renseignement et la Reconnaissance) 
specialized in the elaboration of information and communication systems for command and control networks, 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and  BOA (Bulle Operationnelle  Aero-terrestre)  focuses on the French Army air-ground and ground-ground 
communications.  
24
  DRET was excluded from the DGA in 1997. 
25
  It is estimated that between 1988 and 2000, the workforce was reduced by 30%; this does not take 
account of the change of status of the Department of Naval Construction to a government corporation. 
26
  This was the case for the SCCOA programme in whose technical design and technical evaluation DGA 
played no part, even after the 2003 reform. 
27
  Armaments engineers occupied key positions in the defence programmes at CEA, CNES, ONERA, DGA 
and the firms involved in arms design. The influence of these armaments engineers included definition of 
strategic concept in the fields of the military and foreign policy. However, this model functioned as a closed 
network (Giovachini, 2000). 
28
  Certain technological fields, such as radar technology and electronics, left the fold of the DGA’s 
expertise very early. However, there are some exceptions where DGA’s engineers worked on research 
programmes upstream in firms in order to enable better monitoring of the project. This mobility has been 
reduced compared to before the 1997 reform.  
29
  Scope here refers to the many technological fields in which the DGA is currently active. In depth refers 
to the mastery of two main dimensions: 1) -the different stages in the process of development of an arms 
programme;.2)- the knowledge related to the combination of the programme’s components (architectural 
knowledge) and the knowledge concerning each component (component knowledge).  
 
